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This paper presents a new approach to analysing recent movements of EMU sovereign bond 
spreads. Based on a GARCH-in-mean model originally used in the exchange rate target zone 
literature, spreads are decomposed into a risk premium, an expected loss component and a 
liquidity premium. Time-varying probabilities of default are derived. The results suggest that 
the rise in sovereign spreads during the recent financial crisis mainly reflects an increased 
expected loss component. In addition, the rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008 seems to 
mark a change in market perceptions of sovereign bond risk. The government bonds of 
some countries lost their former role as a safe haven. While price competitiveness always 
helps to explain sovereign spreads, it increasingly moved into investors’ focus as financial 
sector soundness weakened.  
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The spreads of euro-area government bonds over German Bunds widened substantially 
during the financial crisis. They peaked at 300 basis points and remained at their elevated 
level until April 2009, the end of our observation period. At the same time, considerable 
differences in yield spreads across countries have emerged since the second quarter of 
2008. This paper aims, first, at explaining sovereign bond spread movements within the 
euro area during the crisis and, second, at providing high-frequency series of country-
specific probabilities of default. A particular challenge consists in estimating the 
probability of an event that has not happened before (the default of an EMU member 
state) and, at the same time, separating this effect from liquidity concerns and premia 
which are due to the risk aversion of investors. The paper examines this issue using a 
GARCH-in-mean model, which was originally developed for the analysis of exchange 
rate target zones and which allows bond spreads to be decomposed into credit risk, 
liquidity premia and a component reflecting default expectations. The model is estimated 
for a calm period and a crisis episode. Following Mody (2009), the rescue of US 
investment bank Bear Stearns in mid-March 2008 is chosen as the turning point after 
which differentiation of sovereign bonds increased. 
 
2 Related literature 
 
The literature on credit spreads generally distinguishes between structural approaches 
derived from the Merton model (1974) and reduced form models such as those of 
Jarrow/Turnbull (1995).1 In order to be able to use structural approaches to explain 
                                            
* We would like to thank Jörg Breitung, Ulrich Grosch, Heinz Herrmann and participants of the 25th EEA 
Annual Conference in Glasgow and of the Eurosystem and Latin American Central Banks’ Workshop in 
Santiago for their valuable suggestions and comments. All remaining errors are our own. 
1 According to the structural approach, an enterprise's liabilities constitute a put option held by the debtor 
on the enterprise’s value. Wherever an enterprise’s value falls below the nominal value of its liabilities, 
this leads to an – endogenously modelled – default and the option being exercised. By contrast, in the 
case of reduced-form models, the default is determined by an exogenously specified intensity process. 
This process can, in turn, depend on country-specific and macroeconomic factors. 
    1sovereign spreads, it is necessary to define appropriate country-specific proxy variables 
for the level of indebtedness and the volatility of the firm’s value – as, for instance, 
emphasised by Diaz Weigel/Gemmill (2006) and Oshiro/Saruwatari (2005). Such 
approaches have the disadvantage that the calculated measures of sovereign risk (distance 
to default) reflect not only country-specific factors but also risk premia – which vary 
according to investors’ time-varying risk aversion.2 Furthermore structural approaches 
are criticised as being unsuitable for the modelling of sovereign spreads. This argument is 
based on the premise that the state’s incentives to default are much more complicated 
than those of enterprises, with the consequence that the option price theory offers 
insufficient modelling capability. Duffie et al (2003) reason that an enterprise effectively 
goes into default when it becomes unable to fulfil its payment obligations, whereas in the 
case of governments, matters largely hinge on a political decision by the government and 
its willingness to pay, which depends on a variety of considerations and where the default 
can take different forms. 
 
Reduced-form approaches normally use a number of different macro variables as the 
determinants of country risk. The conventional literature, eg Reinhart et al (2003), 
Eichengreen et al (2003) or Goldstein/Turner (2004), analyses the country risks of 
emerging market economies, paying particular attention to debt sustainability, original sin 
and currency mismatches. Under these approaches, country risk is frequently measured 
on the basis of country ratings. However, the rating agencies have been slow to adapt 
their country ratings to the recent financial crisis triggered by events in the US real estate 
market. Moreover, such approaches are unable to provide any explicit information on the 
probability of default of an individual country. In the wake of the financial crisis and the 
resultant government rescue packages for financial institutions in many industrial 
countries, growing attention has been focused on the weaknesses of the financial sector as 
additional determinants of country risks (see, for instance, Mody, 2009). At the same 
time, according to Sgherri/Zoli (2009) it would seem that, in the wake of the financial 
crisis, the relative liquidity of markets has had a major impact on government bonds, a 
circumstance that is likely to have led to a temporary flight to safety and liquidity on the 
part of investors. With respect to the euro area, both Gomez-Puig (2006) and 
                                            
2 Remolona et al (2007) conclude that “…[the] notion that spreads might contain significant risk premia 
that are driven by investors’ risk aversion is not seriously entertained.” 
    2 Manganelli/Wolswijk (2009) identify indications that liquidity is an important 
explanatory factor for the yield spreads between government bonds. 
 
Our GARCH-in-mean approach takes into account both macro variables and the 
soundness of the financial sector and simultaneously enables the decomposition of 
sovereign spread into three components (expected loss components, risk premia and 
liquidity premia). According to Flavin/Limosani (2007, p 105), who analyse the short-
term yield differentials of a number of European countries prior to the introduction of the 
euro, an ARCH-in-mean approach is particularly well suited for this purpose “…as it 
captures the time variation in the premium while at the same time being consistent with 
many of the stylized facts of asset prices such as thick tails and volatility clustering.” 
Kounitis (2007) applies the approach espoused by Flavin/Limosani to analyse corporate 
credit spreads and, in so doing, examines the empirical relevance of the determinants 
recommended by the Merton model (1974).  Unlike the approaches put forward by 
Flavin/Limosani (2007) and Kounitis (2007), our approach explicitly considers the 
liquidity premia that are contained in sovereign spreads. What is more, by including 
financial sector soundness and international competitiveness in the scope of its analysis it 
focuses on determinants that could have played a major role in the financial crisis.  
 
3 Sovereign yield spreads and the probability of default in a monetary union 
 
The analysis of a relationship between yield differentials and perceived probabilities of 
default is based on uncovered interest parity augmented by a time-varying risk premium, 
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where it = yield on a domestic bond with a maturity k at time t,   = the yield on the 
equivalent foreign bond, s
*
t i
t = logarithmic exchange rate between the currencies of the two 
countries under observation expressed in units of the domestic currency per unit of 
foreign currency, and ρt = time-varying risk premium for holding domestic bonds. The 
yield differential is equivalent to the rate at which the domestic currency is expected to 
have depreciated by the time the bond matures plus a risk premium to cover investors’ 
risk aversion. 
 
    3Equation (1) as it stands is, naturally, not suited to describing the situation for two 
countries participating in a currency union. However, the Bertola and Svensson (1993) 
approach to estimating a target-zone model can be used to expand equation (1) to include 
a regime change for cases where the chosen central parity does not appear entirely 
credible. To this end, the exchange rate in a target-zone regime is defined as consisting of 
two components, a central parity ct and the current deviation of the exchange rate from 
this central parity dt: 
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The expected depreciation rate is thus composed of the expected change in the central 
parity and the expected change in the deviation from the central parity. It is assumed that 
the central parity is constant apart from a possible discrete adjustment and that investors 
know neither the level nor the time of a future adjustment of the central parity. Denoting 
the probability of a regime change, ie an adjustment of the central parity, over the life k of 
the bond as πkt, this yields the expected depreciation rate 
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Hallwood et al (2000) is one of the papers on target zones which uses equations such as 
(3) in conjunction with (1) to determine the risk of an adjustment of the central parity.3 If 
the above considerations are applied to the situation within a currency union, the second 
term on the right-hand side of equation (3) drops out; provided there is no regime change, 
no depreciation is expected in a currency union, and so Et(Δdt+k) = 0. 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (3), which describes a realignment of the 
central parity in the target-zone model, can, in the context of a currency union, be 
interpreted as expectations of an exit from the currency union. In this case, the exit would 
be associated with a discrete depreciation of the reintroduced national currency. Bond 
liabilities would be repaid in this national currency without the investor being 
compensated for the depreciation. In other words, the procedure would be as though the 
bond had been issued in national currency and not in euro. This would ultimately equate 
                                            
3 A similar equation is used by Weber (1992) to determine the risk of a realignment of the central parity in 
the EMS. 
    4 to a partial default. However, in a currency union, it is significantly less difficult to effect 
a partial default by repaying only part of the bond liabilities without abandoning the 
common currency. Assuming that the bond in the partner country is safe, Et(Δct+k) can be 
interpreted as the percentage level of the default and πkt as the probability of default, 
regardless of whether this type of regime change is associated with an exit from the 
currency union or with a default while maintaining the euro – the latter being regarded in 
the literature as more likely.4,5 
The insertion of (3) into (1) taking account of Et(Δdt+k) = 0 yields 
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The yield spread within a currency union is composed of the expected default and the risk 
premium. Clearly, in the short history of the euro area, there has been no sovereign 
default yet. However, even rational investors may assign a positive value to the 
probability of default despite there having been no prior default event, for instance 
because the relevant observation period is not deemed long enough. Following the 
literature on exchange rates, this expected loss component can be termed “peso effect”. 
 
4 Econometric approach 
 
In the decomposition of yield spreads into a peso effect, a risk premium and a liquidity 
premium according to equation (4) and the associated determination of time-varying 
probabilities of default, we basically adopt the approach of Hallwood et al (2000, 
hereinafter “HMM”) yet modify it in some respects. Following Glosten et al (1993), they 
use a modified GARCH-in-mean model to describe the risk premium ρt. This model also 
proves appropriate for the present case. As described by Engle et al (1987), risk is 
positively correlated with the conditional variance of the residuals of an estimate of 
expected excess returns, ht, the ARCH-in-mean term, if excess returns are normally 
                                            
4 W Buiter, Sovereign default in the eurozone and the breakup of the eurozone: Sloppy Thinking 101, 
Financial Times, 14 January 2009, argues that the risk of a default or an existing default by a euro-area 
member is likely to reduce rather than increase the incentive to leave the euro area. 
5 Incidentally, the possibility of the first term of the right-hand side of (3) describing a traditional default 
without exchange rate change applies not only to a currency union, but also in the context of target 
zones. Such an interpretation is usually ignored in the literature on target zones, however, presumably 
mainly because, in the major target-zone systems in recent decades, such as the ERM, changes to the 
central parity have been much more frequent than defaults. 
    5distributed. According to Glosten et al’s (1993) asymmetrical GARCH(1,1)-in-mean 
specification,  ht is determined using an ARCH(1) term, a GARCH(1) term and a 
TARCH(1) term. The latter is equivalent to an ARCH(1) term that is multiplied by a 
dummy variable which assumes the value 1 if the residual of the previous period was 
negative. The TARCH(1) term takes account of the fact that the variance may 
asymmetrically depend on the residuals. This is based on the idea that rising spreads may 
cause greater volatility than falling spreads. To sum up, the risk premium is modelled as 
follows: 
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where εt is the residual of an estimation of equation (4). 
 
Yield spreads on sovereign bonds of alternative euro-area countries over corresponding 
German government bond yields, each with a maturity of ten years, have been used as 
endogenous variables  . The ten countries considered are Austria (AT), Belgium 
(BE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the 
Netherlands (NL) and Portugal (PT). Data of daily frequency is used. 
*
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Uncovered interest parity as expressed in equation (1) assumes homogeneity of domestic 
and foreign bonds in terms of liquidity. As has been shown by Sgherri/Zoli (2009), 
however, liquidity concerns played a major role for investors during the recent crisis. We 
therefore extend the approach by adding a liquidity premium on the right hand side of 
equation (4). Unlike most of the literature, we thus allow for heterogeneity in the liquidity 
of bonds. Empirically, we consider two alternative measures of liquidity premia. First, in 
line with earlier studies for the United States and Germany (cf Longstaff, 2004), we use 
the difference between yields of 10-year government-guaranteed bonds issued by the 
German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) and German government bonds as an 
overall liquidity measure of EMU bond markets (λ1t). In order to compute a country-
specific liquidity premium, λ1 is multiplied by a parameter γj which reflects the country’s 
bonds’ sensitivity to EMU liquidity preferences. Parameters γj are estimated. Our second 
measure (λ2jt) is country-specific and based on the difference between bond and (relative) 
CDS spreads. It is computed as the country specific bond spread vis-à-vis Germany 
    6 minus the difference between the country’s CDS premium and the German CDS 
premium.6 The idea behind this measure is that both bond and CDS spreads reflect the 
same credit risk, but for a number of reasons, only the bond spread includes a liquidity 
premium.7
 
The expected loss component, the peso effect, is modelled along the lines of HMM. For 
simplicity, the expected percentage level of the default Et(Δct+k) in (4) is assumed to be 
constant (=  α). Assuming that German government bonds are safe, πkt represents the 
absolute probability of default for the relevant euro-area country. The probability of 
default is determined by exogenous variables. A probit transformation restricts the range 
of values which πkt can assume to the interval [0; 1]. Let zt be the vector of exogenous 
variables, β the associated coefficient vector and Φ the normal distribution function. The 
probability of default is then modelled as 
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The exogenous variables in zjt, which are supposed to influence the default probability of 
country j’s bonds, are the following: the spread between the yields of corporate bonds 
with a BBB credit rating and euro-area government bonds, each with a maturity of seven 
to ten years, xt; a country-specific measure of financial sector soundness, yjt; as well as an 
indicator of a country’s price competitiveness, qjt. As in Mody (2009), the variable yjt is 
constructed as the ratio of the Thomson Financial equity index of the country’s financial 
sector divided by Thomson Financial’s overall equity index. Thus, a decrease in yjt 
indicates a weakening of financial sector soundness. In a related manner, the corporate 
bond spread, xt, is expected to serve as indicator of the severity of the crisis according to 
Gerlach et al (2010). The corporate bond spread reflects financing conditions for firms 
and the macroeconomic growth outlook, which should ultimately determine individual 
countries’ sovereign risk assessment. Corporate bond spreads are only available since 4 
February 2002, which limits the observation period to the subsequent period. 
 
                                            
6 In a few cases, this liquidity measure yields negative values which, in the following, are set equal to zero. 
7 The CDS market is supposed to be much more liquid than the bond market, because the volume of CDS 
contracts is not fixed and it is easy to enter short positions. In addition, there seems to be a clear lead for 
CDS prices over credit spreads in the price discovery process; see Blanco et al (2005) and Dötz (2007). 
    7An indicator of a country’s price competitiveness, qjt, is used as a third exogenous 
variable for determining probabilities of default. More specifically, the effective real 
exchange rate against 19 trading partners based on consumer price indices is normalised 
to its average since 1975. In order to obtain a relative, effective indicator, the 
(logarithmic) indicator value for Germany is deducted from the equivalent (logarithmic) 
real effective exchange rate of the country in question. The indicator based on consumer 
price indices has the advantage of being available on a monthly basis. As it is assumed 
that market players cannot forecast future indicator values, the monthly data are not 
interpolated, but assumed to be constant for all days within a month. Price 
competitiveness is included to take account of the argument put forward by Mody (2009) 
that countries’ sensitivity to the financial crisis is more pronounced the greater the loss of 
competitiveness and growth potential. Mody’s (2009) reasoning also suggests that 
interactions may exist between price competitiveness and financial distress. Therefore, an 
interaction term between the competitiveness indicator and the relative equity index of 
the financial sector, qjtyjt, is included in some specifications. 
 
It is to be expected that the indicator of price competitiveness qjt – given its relatively 
sticky development – has only a small effect on changes in yield differences over time 
but instead helps explain yield spreads across countries. In order to be able to take this 
into account, the model is estimated as a panel as it is done, for instance, in Chanda et al 
(2005). Two of the explanatory variables, the spread on corporate bonds in the euro area, 
xt, as well as one measure of the liquidity premium, λ1t, are identical across countries. 
They are multiplied by a country dummy (for countries j = 2,...,10,  Dj = 1  for  the 
currently considered country j and Dj = 0 otherwise; for the base country j = 1, Austria, 
Dj is always 0). This allows the sensitivity of the yield spreads to the corporate bond 
spread as well as the liquidity premium to be modelled in a country-specific way.8 For a 
given country j, the vector of the explanatory variables for the probability of default is 
therefore  zjt = (1  Djxt  qjt  yjt)’ or, if an interaction term between the competitiveness 
indicator and the relative equity index of the financial sector is included, 
                                            
8 Alternatively, country dummies were used as fixed effects in vector zt. However, it emerged that the real 
exchange rate captures such fixed country effects relatively well, and so country dummies were 
subsequently omitted. In general, it should be noted that the variables that determine the probability of 
default enter into the model in a non-linear fashion as a result of the probit transformation. In an 
estimation of such a non-linear panel, fixed effects, for example, distort the results. However, as the bias 
is proportional to 1/T (cf Arellano/Hahn, 2006) and T ≥ 284 in the present case, this distortion can be 
neglected. 
    8 zjt = (1  Djxt  qjt  yjt  qjtyjt)’. Overall, using liquidity measure λ1t and taking into account (5) 
and (6), equation (4) can be estimated using the system 
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potential problems with endogeneity, all exogenous variables are lagged by one period in 
equation (7). The estimation method used is – as by HMM – FIML with the BFGS 
algorithm for non-linear maximisation. Because the heavily overlapping maturities of the 
endogenous variables mean autocorrelation has to be expected, Newey-West robust 
standard errors are applied.9
 
The default rate α is either estimated or, alternatively, set exogenously to 0.6. Imposing 
an exogenous value to the default rate serves two purposes. The default rate chosen by a 
government often depends more on the willingness to pay rather than the ability, and it is 
thus determined by domestic policy considerations. Furthermore, an exogenous default 
rate facilitates the maximisation of the likelihood function, which, in the present case, is 
difficult owing to multiple non-linearity (ARCH-in-mean term, probit transformation). 
The value of α = 0.6 is taken from Bedford et al (2005), who determined average default 
rates of 50% and 70% respectively for the defaults of Russia in 2000 and Argentina in 
2005. 
 
                                            
9 The number of lags used is set to six. The panel structure of the model may suggest applying instead a 
cluster robust variance estimator for two dimensions of clusters as proposed by Thompson (2010) and 
Cameron et al (2006) in order to deal with correlation across countries as well as autocorrelation. 
However, both Cameron et al (2006) and Thompson (2010) use Monte Carlo simulations to show that 
double clustering creates a size bias which results in considerable overrejections in small samples. Thus, 
Thompson (2010) recommends double clustering only for panels where both N ≥ 25 and T ≥ 25, while 
in the present case N = 10. In order to check for robustness nevertheless, we used a cluster robust 
variance estimator for one of the specifications and found that the estimated variances were only 
marginally affected. 
    95 Results 
 
Because the financial crisis can be assumed to have a lasting impact on the coefficients of 
the estimate, the system (7) was estimated separately for the period prior to and the 
period since the onset of the financial crisis. We follow Mody (2009) in using the rescue 
of US investment bank Bear Stearns as the turning point between the two periods, which 
are thus defined as 17 March 2008 to 30 April 2009 and 4 February 2002 to 14 March 
2008. 
 
Table 1a presents the results for the period since the onset of the financial crisis using the 
country-specific liquidity premium measure λ2jt, Table 1b the results using liquidity 
premium measure λ1t. In specification (2), the interaction term is added which is not 
present in specification (1). Generally, plausible and significant coefficients are estimated 
for the GARCH equation (υ0 - υ3). Negative residuals have proven far less persistent than 
positive ones (υ1 > υ1+υ2). The GARCH-in-mean coefficient δ is significantly positive in 
line with the hypothesis that rising risk leads to larger interest rate spreads. 
 
As expected, a higher liquidity premium in the mean equation raises the sovereign spread 
significantly (γ > 0 in table 1a and γ+γj > 0 in table 1b).10 Table 1b also suggests that the 
sensitivity to liquidity concerns is higher in Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland and Italy 
compared to the other countries. The β1 coefficients in tables 1a and 1b imply that the 
perceived probability of default and thus the yield spread over German government bonds 
rose as the virulence of the financial crisis increased (as measured by rising spreads on 
corporate bonds; cf β1+β1j).11 However, the strength of the response varied. While the 
probability of default in France and Belgium increased only moderately, its rise was 
much more pronounced in countries like Greece and Italy. 
 
A fall in the relative equity index of the financial sector indicates growing distress in the 
financial sector and thus raises sovereign spreads (cf β3 < 0). According to β2, a real 
appreciation is also associated with a mostly significantly higher probability of default. 
Lower price competitiveness leads investors to conclude that growth rates could be lower 
                                            
10 When using liquidity premium measure λ1t, the base country Austria as well as Spain turn out to be 
exceptions to this rule (cf table 1b). 
11 As an exception, Austria in specification (1) as well as the Netherlands display a negative sign in table 
1a. Such an outcome may be quite reasonable, as is explained in the section on the pre-Bear Stearns 
results. 
    10 and public debt higher in future. However, low competitiveness, which – in the currency 
union – is the result of high price and wage increases in the recent past, could also be 
associated with a lack of political will to expect the public to accept financial cutbacks. 
This would directly indicate a lack of willingness to consolidate and therefore increase 
the probability of default and thus interest rate spreads. The negative coefficient on the 
interaction term included in specifications (2), β4, shows that the sensitivity to an 
increased virulence of the financial crisis has been more pronounced the lower the price 
competitiveness of the country considered. 
 
In the estimation for the period prior to the financial crisis, the liquidity premium measure 
λ1t has generally been used because, due to data limitations, λ2jt is available for the post-
Bear Stearns period only. The estimation results for the pre-crisis period are shown in 
Table 2. Only the results for the default rate, α, being exogenously set to 0.6 are shown 
because estimated default rates were implausibly small (see also the discussion on α in 
chapter 4). In terms of their sign, the results often do not differ much from those for the 
period since. One significant deviation, however, relates to the coefficient of the spreads 
for corporate bonds, which is negative for many countries in the period prior to the crisis, 
examples being Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (see eg β1  or 
β1+β1,NL respectively). In these countries, an increase in corporate spreads is likely to 
have been regarded less as a warning signal about the stability of the economy as a whole 
than as a company- or industry-specific issue at that time. In this case, investors are likely 
to have restructured their portfolios partly in favour of supposedly safe government 
bonds, thereby reducing their return. In that sense, β1 is dominated by a substitution effect 
in some countries of the pre-crisis period. 
 
As a second notable deviation from the post-Bear Stearns results, the coefficient for the 
real exchange rate in specification (2), β2, is significantly negative in the pre-crisis period 
and that for the interaction term, β4, is significantly positive. At this time, a real 
appreciation brought about by relatively high domestic inflation has obviously not been 
perceived as a sign of mounting problems but – in a more shortsighted view – rather as 
reflecting the often concomitant dynamic growth, which would facilitate the repayment 
of government debt. This result contrasts somewhat with Mody (2009), who found that 
the real exchange rate only had an impact on yield differentials in the euro area during the 
crisis. 
 
    11The probabilities of default which can be calculated from the estimated model relate to a 
default event within the next ten years. They can be converted into probabilities of default 
within a one-year period using the formula 
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For the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain, this probability of default did not differ 
perceptibly from zero in the period prior to the crisis. For the other euro-area states, the 
likelihood of a default within a year was also very low in the pre-crisis period. For Italy, 
for example, the figure is less than 0.2% for most of the time. 
 
During the financial crisis, the probability of default rose significantly in most countries 
(but not in Austria and the Netherlands), peaking in March 2009, and then dropped off 
again. This is exemplified by Italy in figure 2. The maximum probabilities of default 
reached within a one-year period (in %) are shown in Table 3 for all the countries in the 
sample. The probabilities of default in all euro-area countries, being close to zero 
previously, have risen considerably since the onset of the crisis. In addition, the table also 
demonstrates that the probabilities of default have fanned out significantly since the onset 
of the crisis, a result which is in line with Mody’s (2009) findings, for example. 
 
Nevertheless, the figures should be interpreted with caution. It should be stressed that the 
probabilities of default are ultimately calculated from observed yield differentials and 
therefore reflect the situation adequately only if one believes that the market is capable of 
doing so during the crisis, which was at times marked by panic. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates to what extent the observed yield differentials during the crisis can be 
attributed to the peso effect of a default (the expected loss component) and to what extent 
they are the result of the liquidity premium or a risk premium, which reflects uncertainty 
about the expected return of the investment. Evidently, during the crisis the peso effect 
dominated interest-rate differentials, especially in countries where yield spreads were 
high. In Austria and the Netherlands, the risk premium makes a substantial contribution 
to the spread over German government bonds, particularly at the current end. This may 
hint at speculative pressure against these countries. The liquidity premium played an 
especially important role in Finland, France and Portugal. 
 
    12 6 Conclusions 
 
This paper presents a new approach for analysing recent movements in EMU sovereign 
bond spreads. Based on a GARCH-in-mean model originally used in the target zone 
literature, spreads are decomposed into a risk premium, an expected loss component and 
a liquidity premium. Time-varying probabilities of default are derived. While the model 
could, in principle, also be applied to bonds with shorter maturities, we focus on long-
term bonds with a maturity of 10 years due to the role of German Bunds as benchmark 
bonds. The structure of the model is general enough to be applicable to other countries or 
regions and other observation periods as well. 
 
The results suggest that market perceptions of sovereign risk changed after the rescue of 
Bear Stearns in March 2008. As a result, the government bonds of some countries lost 
their previous role as a domestic safe haven. In the period prior to the Bear Stearns 
rescue, implied probabilities of default were negligible. The subsequent strong rise in 
several euro-area sovereign bond spreads mainly reflects an increased expected loss 
component. As an example, the implied probability of default for Irish sovereign bonds 
amounted to more than 6% at its peak. Important determinants of sovereign spreads, 
which are responsible for the rise in the expected loss, are a country’s financial sector 
soundness and its price competitiveness. Interestingly, the combined effect of both 
variables has also proved important for spread developments during the crisis period 
considered. This suggests that price competitiveness moved into investors’ focus as 
financial sector soundness weakened. Risk and liquidity premia generally played a minor 
part in spread widening of countries with high yield spreads, such as Greece or Italy. 
While there are signs that risk premia had an effect, particularly in Austria and the 
Netherlands, liquidity premia seem to have been most important in Finland, France and 
Portugal. The often dominant role of the expected loss component reflects the importance 
of fundamental country-specific factors as compared with global factors such as 
investors’ general risk aversion. 
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    16 Table 1a: Estimation for the period since the rescue of Bear Stearns (17.03.2008 – 









  α = 0.6  α = 0.6  α estimated  α estimated 








α    0.27* (0.03)  0.36* (0.11)
β0 0.78* (0.08)  -0.31* (0.01) 1.61* (0.35)  -0.11 (0.56)
β1 -3.19* (0.59)  11.46* (0.31) -1.70 (0.93)  13.19* (1.76)
β1,BE 8.60* (0.48)  -2.19* (0.49) 9.98* (0.85)  -2.32* (1.14)
β1,ES 13.21* (0.65)  -0.25 (0.32) 16.12* (1.00)  -0.73 (0.89)
β1,FI 18.21* (0.57)  2.46* (0.56) 20.00* (1.47)  1.84 (1.77)
β1,FR 6.84* (0.49)  -5.28* (0.45) 7.08* (0.67)  -5.99* (0.73)
β1,GR 24.94* (0.67)  10.91* (0.39) 33.66* (2.80)  12.58* (1.80)
β1,IE 10.00* (0.87)  -4.02* (0.57) 15.41* (1.41)  -6.35 (3.41)
β1,IT 20.76* (0.60)  8.14* (0.45) 25.45* (1.54)  9.10* (1.57)
β1,NL -4.73* (0.75)  -13.94* (2.82) -5.18* (1.40)  -14.90* (2.28)
β1,PT 11.12* (0.68)  -2.08* (0.44) 14.62* (0.89)  -3.59 (2.03)
β2 0.52* (0.15)  6.22* (0.27) 0.02 (0.17)  11.33 (7.47)
β3 -0.62* (0.02)  -0.40* (0.003) -0.73* (0.07)  -0.41* (0.12)
β4   -1.14* (0.05)   -2.18 (1.49)
γ  0.64* (0.01)  0.58* (0.02) 0.59* (0.02)  0.60* (0.02)
δ  34.66* (1.91)  15.20* (2.21) 24.69* (2.12)  17.38* (1.99)
υ0 0.00* (0.00)  0.00* (0.00) 0.00* (0.00)  0.00* (0.00)
υ1 0.82* (0.05)  0.94* (0.08) 1.02* (0.09)  0.94* (0.08)
υ2 -0.74* (0.05)  -0.58* (0.08) -0.82* (0.07)  -0.62* (0.09)
υ3 0.54* (0.01)  0.44* (0.05) 0.48* (0.02)  0.45* (0.03)
A star indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
    17Table 1b: Estimation for the period since the rescue of Bear Stearns (17.03.2008 – 









  α = 0.6  α = 0.6  α estimated  α estimated 








α    0.43* (0.01)  0.16* (0.01)
β0 0.76* (0.09)  0.97* (0.04) 1.53* (0.01)  1.89* (0.66)
β1 18.40* (0.50)  18.35* (0.19) 20.09* (0.32)  30.79* (1.58)
β1,BE -9.93* (0.59)  -10.42* (0.54) -11.88* (0.59)  -16.32* (2.34)
β1,ES -2.87* (0.60)  -2.71* (0.28) 2.70* (0.21)  -2.74 (1.45)
β1,FI 2.53* (0.94)  2.93* (0.54) 3.19* (0.37)  -1.42 (2.53)
β1,FR -6.43* (0.49)  -6.50* (0.35) -7.49* (0.29)  -12.28* (1.94)
β1,GR 6.85* (1.01)  7.36* (0.38) 9.53* (0.37)  26.99* (3.97)
β1,IE -13.70* (1.00)  -14.32* (0.45) -15.37* (0.31)  -25.92* (2.00)
β1,IT 0.83* (0.42)  1.88* (0.44) 1.30* (0.37)  3.87* (1.73)
β1,NL -8.90* (0.43)  -9.25* (0.35) -10.42* (0.22)  -17.24* (7.73)
β1,PT -7.09* (0.81)  -6.93* (0.46) -6.87* (0.55)  -11.59* (1.53)
β2 1.37* (0.65)  1.59* (0.12) 0.82* (0.01)  14.04* (3.80)
β3 -0.65* (0.01)  -0.69* (0.01) -0.79* (0.01)  -0.81* (0.14)
β4   -0.14* (0.05)   -2.74* (0.83)
γ  -1.40* (0.35)  -1.30* (0.11) -1.32* (0.23)  -0.97* (0.29)
γBE 5.22* (0.35)  5.20* (0.30) 5.29* (0.36)  5.33* (0.79)
γES 0.63* (0.32)  0.79* (0.21) 0.82* (0.21)  0.41 (0.39)
γFI 5.18* (0.25)  4.98* (0.17) 5.07* (0.18)  4.82* (0.36)
γFR 2.59* (0.18)  2.48* (0.15) 2.57* (0.17)  2.74* (0.29)
γGR 4.93* (1.01)  5.54* (0.54) 5.36* (0.39)  1.58* (0.62)
γIE 4.69* (0.74)  5.28* (0.37) 5.49* (0.31)  5.71* (0.92)
γIT 5.24* (0.34)  5.20* (0.46) 5.28* (0.40)  4.70* (0.40)
γNL 1.41* (0.16)  1.39* (0.15) 1.44* (0.17)  1.84* (0.25)
γPT 2.88* (0.60)  3.08* (0.28) 3.03* (0.29)  2.94* (0.51)
δ  4.19* (1.01)  3.97* (0.65) 4.31* (0.91)  10.04* (1.63)
υ0 0.00* (0.00)  0.00* (0.00) 0.00* (0.00)  0.00* (0.00)
υ1 1.02* (0.09)  1.03* (0.07) 1.04* (0.09)  1.09* (0.07)
υ2 -0.40* (0.12)  -0.40* (0.08) -0.42* (0.11)  -0.69* (0.09)
υ3 0.29* (0.05)  0.29* (0.04) 0.28* (0.04)  0.38* (0.04)
A star indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 






  α = 0.6  α = 0.6 




α   
β0 -0.67* (0.02)  0.81 (0.50)
β1 -32.08* (4.80)  -10.65* (3.44)
β1,BE 52.73* (4.39)  31.59* (3.22)
β1,ES -67.66* (8.55)  -523.71* (17.12)
β1,FI 57.28* (4.49)  32.64* (3.11)
β1,FR 39.19* (5.02)  18.84* (3.53)
β1,GR 37.84* (4.74)  35.14* (3.20)
β1,IE -72.21* (21.73)  -98.54* (9.89)
β1,IT 49.72* (4.61)  36.63* (3.99)
β1,NL -40.80* (12.49)  -50.26* (12.70)
β1,PT -31.58* (5.80)  1.64 (3.56)
β2 4.86* (0.17)  -34.94* (4.13)
β3 -0.39* (0.01)  -0.71* (0.11)
β4  8.15*  (0.87)
γ  1.61* (0.20)  1.06* (0.18)
γBE -0.33 (0.25)  -0.06 (0.24)
γES 1.67* (0.30)  2.93* (0.24)
γFI 0.26 (0.26)  1.48* (0.21)
γFR -0.26 (0.35)  0.29 (0.26)
γGR -0.19 (0.44)  -0.81* (0.38)
γIE -0.57 (0.84)  1.39* (0.22)
γIT 4.11* (0.76)  9.73* (0.66)
γNL 0.73* (0.26)  1.36* (0.25)
γPT 4.99* (0.31)  3.42* (0.36)
δ  27.01* (2.66)  5.72* (1.00)
υ0 0.00* (0.00)  0.00* (0.00)
υ1 0.66* (0.03)  0.53* (0.03)
υ2 -0.32* (0.03)  -0.06* (0.02)
υ3 0.49* (0.02)  0.49* (0.03)
A star indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
    19Table 3: Market perceptions of maximum probabilities of default (%) within a one-year 
period during the financial crisis according to the estimation results shown in the first 
column of table 1a (liquidity measure: λ2jt, default rate: 60%, no interaction term) 
 
AT BE ES FI  FR GR IE  IT  NL PT 
0.2 1.1 1.4 0.5 0.5 3.5 6.4 2.2 0.2 1.4 
 
 
    20 Figure 1: Bond spreads on euro-area government bonds versus Germany 
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    21Figure 2: Probability of default for Italian sovereign bonds with a maturity of ten years 

































































































































































































































































































    22 Figure 3: Decomposition of sovereign bond spreads (cumulated over 10 years) based on 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bond spread Expected loss Risk premium Liquidity premium  
                                            
12 Deviations between bond spread and the sum of expected loss, risk premium and liquidity premium are 
caused by residuals εjt. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bond spread Expected loss Risk premium Liquidity premium  
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